GFW Blocks Article on GFW?

Wired Magazine has a story by Oliver August about his experiences with Chinese surveillance. While investigating the story of Lai Changxing, China's most wanted man, August was detained in Fujian. He also came back to his office one day to find cables on his computer rearranged, and a piece of paper with his address written in unfamiliar handwriting. This comes on the heels of the Time China blog's Bill Powell mentioning that a friend working for a metal bending company found a cell phone modified into a tracking device attached to the bottom of his car.

I'm having some difficulty pulling up this particular article on Wired without a proxy, while the rest of Wired loads fine. Anybody else have a problem?

China's Future: A Clockwork Orange?

China's Dangerous Future? Or Poor Scholarship?

For a few years now, there have been periodic mentions in the press of a study on the potential threat posed by China's impending surplus of young, unmarried males. In these stories, they have been described as a "geopolitical time bomb", "bachelor bomb" and a threat to democracy. The source of this theory is a paper written in 2002 by Andrea Den Boer and Valerie Hudson entitled "A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex Ratios in Asia's Largest States", later expanded to book form in Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male Population, published in 2004. The study always seemed suspect to me, and after reading some of the supporting literature, I have a few ideas why.

Hudson and Den Boer define "surplus males" differently from "single men", though many news articles on the topic use these interchangeably. The term "bare branches" refers to the Chinese word guanggun (光棍 ), or men without marriage prospects. Surplus males are the unintended consequence of son preference, as there aren't enough women to go around for all of these favorite sons to marry. A "single man", in contrast, has prospects for dating, marriage and reproduction. Bare branches are simply left out of the marriage market because supply doesn't meet demand. Den Boer and Hudson estimate the number of surplus males by counting the difference between the number of men and women aged 15-34. By this reckoning, according to the US Census International Database, China had nearly 15 million surplus males in 1990. Using the sex ratio at birth, they estimate this will reach 30 million by 2020 - possibly 40 million if more generous birth ratios are substituted. the same Census tables, I calculate that current the number of surplus males is 14 million and change.*

Den Boer then go on to argue that surplus males, according to overwhelming literature, tend to be more aggressive, violent and criminal. I don't really have a problem with arguing that unmarried single men in their twenties are often a bunch of hotheads. But they cite a study by Allan Mazur and company stating that testosterone levels, very much correlated with aggression, are higher in unmarried and divorced men. What they do not mention, however, is that Mazur's study focuses on a reciprocal model for testosterone rather than the widely used basal model. In other words, the idea that testosterone levels are affected by being divorced or unmarried, as opposed to a man's naturally high testosterone level affecting his chances of being divorced or married. Mazur et al. say that while the reciprocal theory better explains short-term T increases in Air Force veterans after divorce, the basal theory better explains overall likelihood of divorce. Moreover, they point out that one would expect a concentration of high-T men in lower classes, but in fact they are evenly distributed, pointing to an "invisible" stream of prosocial high-T men.

Basically, there's a chicken-and-the-egg problem (do men lack a partner because they have high testosterone that makes them antisocial, or do men become antisocial because they have no partner?), as well as evidence that high testosterone does not necessarily make one antisocial, aggressive or violent. Like I said, I personally find it believable that young unmarried men are more likely to make trouble, but Den Boer and Hudson peg their argument on an evolutionary psychology model that seems to raise doubts.

Then there is the argument that when bare branches congregate its bad news, for which they cite David Courtwright's Violent Land:

Men who congregate with men tend to be more sensitive about status and reputation. Even if they are not intoxicated with drink or enraged by insult, they instinctively test one another, probing for signs of weakness. . . . disreputable, lower-class males . . . exercised much greater influence in bachelor communities like bunkhouses and mining camps. They both tempted and punished, for to fail to emulate their vices was to fail, in their own terms, to be a man.

While this certainly describes, say, a frat party, it seems awfully reductionist, as does the emphasis on testosterone. Men are reduced to hormone driven robots of sorts. Den Boer and Hudson do not address factors such as family, economics, political events, moral codes, social policies or organizations, or indeed anything else that might affect the behavior of these men. I can't help but be reminded of the dehumanizing labeling of child offenders as "superpredators" in the 1990s, or jokes about how a woman president would start a nuclear war during her time of the month.

They go on to say "It is possible that this intrasocietal violence may have intersocietal consequences as well." This is where Den Boer and Hudson make the leap from an increase in crime due to surplus males to the supposition that it could increase the chances of war or other major forms of conflict. They give no citations, no footnotes and no supporting literature for this assertion. Instead, they then qualify their statement:

It is important to note that we are not claiming that the presence of significant numbers of bare branches causes violence; violence can be found in all societies, regardless of sex ratio. Indeed, to give but one example, the sex ratio of Rwanda in 1994 was normal. Rather the opportunity for such violence to emerge and become relatively large-scale is heightened by socially prevalent selection for bare branches. We see this factor as having an amplifying or aggravating effect. To use a natural metaphor, the presence of dry, bare branches cannot cause are in and of itself, but when the sparks begin to fly, those bare branches provide kindling sufficient to turn the sparks into a fire larger and more dangerous than otherwise.

While it is a lovely metaphor, this hardly seems a supportable claim. If they are simply stating that violence is "heightened" by the presence of bare branches, it begs the question: heightened compared to what? Remember that according to U.S. Census data, China has had about 15 million surplus males for at least the past 20 years. Shouldn't we be seeing an increase in violence that can be demonstrably linked, or at least correlated to the male surplus population right now? There are the reports of increased mass demonstrations that are heard so often, but these have been increasing while the male surplus population has held steady, and there are plenty of other reasons for these protests (many of which involved women and older people), such as growing inequality, the rise of the Internet and cell phones, etc. etc. Plus the statistic itself isn't at all reliable, as there are conflicting definitions of a "mass incident". Den Boer and Hudson point to reports of high crime rates among migrant workers in China, who they believe share a large overlap with bare branches. But during this time the number of bare branches has remained steady. Other factors such as discrimination, lack of a social safety net, poor economic opportunities and the like can easily explain this. Do we even need an argument that testosterone is involved, and can this even be demonstrated?

Moreover, Den Boer and Hudson calculate it simply by subtracting the male population of 15-34 years of age from the corresponding female population. But there are other factors affecting the gender ratio. For one, prostitutes. Maureen Fan reports in the Washington Post that estimates of Chinese prostitutes range from 1 to 10 million. One estimate from 2001 mentioned by the Kinsey Institute says 3 million, which doesn't seem unlikely. It doesn't seem a stretch to assume that a majority of female sex workers will be in the 18-34 range, or that they are off the marriage market. Consider also that concubinage is not completely unknown at the moment and just a few years ago it was estimated that Hong Kong men alone have half a million children by mainland mistresses. So slap on another million, and you find China has been dealing with a surplus of nearly 20 million bare branches for at least a decade. Yet the effects and management of these surplus males through the years is not addressed at all in Den Boer and Hudson's paper. Considering that China is hardly becoming instable right now due to violence, despite this surplus, one would assume that a) there is a tipping point at which the ratio becomes too imbalanced, which DB/H never suggest or b) there are some social or cultural factors at work that are mitigating the violence caused by surplus males. But DB/H explicitly state that the only way to reduce the violence is to reduce the number of surplus males, something that is not happening.

DB/H proceed to give three "suggestive" historical examples, one of which is the Nien Rebellion. A series of natural disasters led to widespread poverty and starvation in Huai-pei, which increased the level of infanticide and resulted in a sex ratio of 129 men to every 100 women, and as many as 25% of men were unable to marry at all. DB/H cite James L. Watson's work on bachelor subcultures to point out that "unmarried men have little face to preserve because they do not command much respect in the community... these “bare sticks” had nothing to lose except their reputations for violence." They claim that right now China is recreating "the vast army of bare sticks that plagued it during the nineteenth century". But they quote Watson as also saying "most bare branches in his study were semiliterate and were third, fourth, or fifth sons whose families were too poor to offer them an inheritance. In many cases, these noninheriting sons were “pushed out” (tuei chu) of their fathers’ houses in their teens, and came to live in bachelor houses with groups of other unmarried youths. In their early twenties, they would move out of the bachelor house and in with a collective of men—a dormitory of workers, a monastery or religious brotherhood, or the local militia. In each case, they would spend much of their leisure time learning and practicing the martial arts."

There are significant differences between this case study and modern China. First of all, the Nien Rebellion and the gender imbalance itself, by DB/H's own description, were primarily the result of massive disasters and poverty. Whether the bare branches intensified the conflict seems unprovable - if you are married with a family you cannot feed, are you any less likely to join a rebel army in the hopes of providing for them? More importantly, in contemporary China, there are few 3rd, 4th or 5th sons. Most bare branches will be only or second children, and with China's growing elderly population, it seems less likely they will be pushed out of the house to prove themselves. Rather, it seems quite likely they will be kept around the house to care for their aging parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles. If they migrate to work, they will still have parents dependent on them for support. Watson illustrates a clear role for social factors in the likelihood that these men will turn to violence - social factors that DB/H consider irrelevant later on.

And finally, monasteries and brotherhoods hardly play a role today like they did in the mid-nineteenth century. In later detailing some of the history of these groups, DB/H opine: "Given the high sex ratios of its society, perhaps the grave suspicion with which the current Chinese government views movements such as the Falun Gong is not entirely unfounded in light of this history." The Chinese government probably does have groups like the Heaven and Earth Society in mind when they worry about Falun Gong, but it should be pointed out that Falun Gong has overwhelmingly appealed to the elderly, not angry young men. In this case it would be China's growing elderly population that would be the source of trouble, not bare branches.

Perhaps roving bands of grannies might be the real problem

The most problematic assertion in DB/H's paper is when they suggest that the presence of bare branches drives the development of authoritarian societies. Perhaps one could argue a surplus female population does too, since Hitler rose to power while Germany had around 2 million extra women. But here Den Boer and Hudson quote the work of Christian Mesquida and Neil Weiner: “Choice of political system made by the members of a population is somewhat restricted by the age composition of its male population.” However, they also quote Mesquida and Weiner's conclusion:

“Our analyses of interstate and intrastate episodes of collective aggression since the 1960s indicate the existence of a consistent correlation between the ratio of males 15 to 29 years of age per 100 males 30 years of age and older, and the level of coalitional aggression as measured by the number of reported conflict related deaths.”

Mesquida and Weiner do indeed name a tipping point for major conflict, and allow for mitigating circumstances - unlike Den Boer and Hudson:

"Populations with ratios of young males exceeding 60 per I00 males 30+ are predicted to move toward a state of internal or external conflict, unless there exist particular mitigating circumstances such as an extremely rapid increase in resource availability or new possibilities to migrate to more productive environments."

If one looks at U.S. Census data comparing the ratio of 15-34 year old males to 35+ year old males (weighing the ratio even more in Den Boer and Hudson's favor than Mesquida and Weiner's original age groupings) in China from 2000-2020, it is clearly steadily decreasing as China's population grays. In 1996, the ratio of younger men to older was 104:100, which by Mesquida and Weiner's scale ought to have provoked a major conflict. In 2005, the ratio was closer to 75:100. In 2020? 65:100. By Mesquida and Weiner's argument, the chances of China's sex ratio causing problems in the future are less, not more, than the past decade. Den Boer and Hudson's references to Robert Wright's The Moral Animal and Laura Betzig's study of the link between despotism and polygyny (men hoarding wives and mistresses), since they infer that these works argue that gender imbalances are only governable by authoritarian regimes, when both seem only to suggest that there is a correlation between imbalanced sex ratios and authoritarianism - not that only one can deal with a preponderous of men.

Den Boer and Hudson's prescribe "there is only one short-term strategy for dealing with a serious bare-branch problem: Reduce their numbers. There are several traditional ways to do so: Fight them, encourage their self-destruction, or export them."

The assumption here is that non-spousal family obligations, non-violent forms of single male social engagement, increased economic opportunity and other social support mechanisms count for nothing. Surplus males cannot be made into productive members of society, and therefore must be eliminated. It seems grossly reductionist but is a natural conclusion given all the ignored factors previously mentioned.

Similar criticisms have also been raised before in the Chronicle of Higher Education.

One case study that Den Boer and Hudson don't explore at all is the Chinese bachelor subculture that existed in nineteenth century America. According to Thinkquest, "In 1860, the sex ratio of males to females was already 19:1. In 1890, the ratio widened to 27:1. For more than half a century, the Chinese lived in, essentially, a bachelor society where the old men always outnumbered the young." Chinese immigrants did indeed represent a disproportionate number of arrests and criminal activity, but there were such aggravating factors such as the racist violence perpetrated against them. Some have argued that Chinese were still less prone to violence despite mob violence against them. Moreover, there is a great deal of evidence that ""public officials and the general public" accepted [Chinese on Chinese] "interpersonal violence … [as] to a large extent a private matter"". Den Boer and Hudson could argue that this is an example of a government (though I wonder if they would characterize California officials as "authoritarian") allowing bare branches to destroy one another. But one could just as easily suggest that with proper law enforcement and a lack of discrimination, these immigrants would not have been anywhere near as violent. But if one accepts that these men are unstoppably driven to be violent, as Den Boer and Hudson argue, then there wouldn't be any reason to help them.

Available on eBay: The Chinese Must Go mechanical cast iron cap pistol

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* It should be noted that I consulted the China Statistical Yearbook as well, but found that according to their, the 18-34 population actually has a tiny surplus of females, not males. Also perplexing was that, when totaled, the number of currently married women exceeded the number of married males by several million. To my knowledge there are nowhere near that many Chinese women married to foreigners (who remain Chinese citizens counted in the census). Anybody know why?

Dear WaPo: Muslim is not an Ethnic Group in China

The Washington Post has an interesting article on Iraqi and other "immigrants" in China, particularly in Yiwu, Zhejiang. The thrust of the article, titled "Chasing the Chinese Dream", is that "For a growing number of the world's emigrants, China -- not the United States -- is the land where opportunities are endless, individual enterprise is rewarded and tolerance is universal." The article then goes on to undermine this more or less completely towards the end by mentioning that these "immigrants" couldn't even bury one of their dead in China, and only 700 foreigners have the equivalent of a green card.

Anyway, I was struck by this bit:

Over the past 20 years, the government has gradually allowed its own Muslim minority to rebuild institutions that were devastated by state-sponsored attacks on Islam during the Cultural Revolution. Islamic schools have opened, and scholars of Islam are being encouraged to go abroad to pursue their studies. Unlike Christians, China's estimated 20 million Muslims are considered an ethnic minority, a status that confers certain protections and privileges.

OK... uh, China still confiscates passports to prevent Uyghurs from going on the Hajj, bans students, children and those employed by the government (which is alot of people in Xinjiang) from attending mosques, and all schools and imams are licensed and controlled by the state.

But even more wrong is the assertion that Muslim is "an ethnic minority" and the false comparison to Christianity. This is a misunderstanding that probably arose because one particular ethnic group associated with Islam, the Hui, are often called "Muslim Chinese". While the Hui are historically defined by their religion, as an ethnic group, they are defined by heritage. You are Hui if your mom and/or dad was Hui. You cannot convert to Hui, though there are Chinese citizens who dig up any scrap of minority ancestry they can so they can miss out on the One Child Policy. Also, you are still Hui even if you don't follow Islam, and many do just that.

The other problem with stating Muslim is "an ethnic minority" is that Muslims in China are found amongst various ethnic groups. Specifically, besides the Hui, there are the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Bonan and Tatars.

And then there's the bizarre Case of the Hui Tibetan, and in fact the Muslim Tibetan as well. This distinction is based on the legend of a Muslim named Pir Jacob, who came from the West and was granted land to build a mosque by the Fifth Dalai Lama after he spotted Jacob through a telescope. The Hui Tibetans, on the other hand, were Muslims who came to Tibet from China Proper to the East. The two groups have moved closer together in recent history.

1897: Strange Tales of Highbinders and Child Actors

Poster from the Tuku Archive

The First Born was a stage play written in late 19th century San Francisco by Francis Powers. It was later made into a film in 1921. The New York Times described the story:

Even though most of the actors are Caucasian, with the exception of star Sessue Hayakawa, this tragic romantic drama tries to remain true to the spirit of the Orient (or at least what white folks assumed it was like). Loey Tsing, the first love of Chan Wang, is sold into slavery by her father. Although Chan marries another, he still loves Loey; only the birth of a son relieves his unhappiness. He adores little Chan Toy even though he finds nothing to like about his wife. Through his job running a lumber yard in San Francisco, Chan comes to the home of a wealthy Chinaman, Man Low Yek. It turns out that he is Loey Tsing's master. When Man Low Yek sees the two together, he angrily swears revenge and invites Chan's unfaithful wife up to the house. She brings Chan Toy, and the frightened little boy falls out a window. Chan finds him crumbled and dead and is overcome with grief. Through the use of his wiles, he causes the death of both Man Low Yek and his wife. Then he and Loey Tsing return home to China together.

In The Production and Consumption of Chinese Theater in Nineteenth Century California, Daphne Lei argues that the original production involved the "first Chinese actor to appear on the English speaking stage in the U.S." According to scholar Lois Rather, Kim Poon, "a product of local schools", played the friend of the title character. Unfortunately, at the time it was not clear if Kim Poon was the name of the actor or the character he played, and he did "not have any significant lines, except for some ‘laughter and Chinese exclamations’ like “Hi la, hi la”. It is ironic that the first Chinese actor on the English-speaking stage was a non-speaking character."

The play was a huge hit, and toured New York and London. On October 6, 1897, a New York Times critic wrote:

The two scenic pictures, representing a street in Chinatown in the bustle of a noonday, and an alley at night with contiguous gambling houses and opium dens, are such as impress the spectator with a sense of reality... it, first of all, pictures the routine of life among the Mongolians of the Pacific coast, but it involves a simple, tragic story which is characteristic of the race, as we Westerners understand it... The music ... is performed by a band of thirty-two musicians (some of them armed with Chinese instruments)... The pantomime is expressive and interesting, and all so strange that the spectator shivers a bit, though the sight of the steeple of a nearby Christian church rising above the joss-house is reassuring... The chatter is all in Chinese. There is some sort of trouble about a boycott of one Man Low Yek, ordered by the highbinders... A party of "white devils" is "slumming" in Chinatown that night. The spectator feels that he is one of the party, and enjoys special privileges.

The term "highbinder" is one with a murky origin. The American Heritage Dictionary lists its definition as a "corrupt politician" and a "A member of a Chinese-American secret society of paid assassins and blackmailers." It lists the etymology as "After the Highbinders, a group of ruffians in New York City c. 1806." By the late 19th century, it had become a term not only for Chinese gangsters, but for Chinese people in general:

Types of Highbinders, from The Wasp, 1901-02

Highbinder weapons circa 1900

The Linguistlist listserv had a thread about it, pointing out

It may be that the Chinese 'highbinder' has a discrete origin: thus Asbury _Barbary Coast_ (1933) 185: 'The _boo how doy_, popularly known as hatchetmen or highbinders, received regular salaries, with extra pay for exceptional bravery in battle.' Asbury discusses them at length in the succeeding pages but essays no further etymology. 'Boo how doy' literally, at least in his translation, means 'fighting men'.

In 1886, Harpers Weekly had a whole article about highbinders (from the excellent HarpWeek archives):

When the Chinese began to flock to California in large numbers, attracted by gold mining and the promise of work on the overland railroad, they formed for mutual protection what are known as the Six Companies. These were fashioned on the principle of trade guilds. The men from Canton, for instance, formed one company, those from Hong-Kong another. The members paid regular dues, for which the society furnished them hospital care when sick, and guaranteed that their bones should be carefully transported to China in case of death. They were also to be aided in any difficulty with Chinese of other companies or with whites. The company rooms were the head-quarters for the members, where they could get the latest news from China. Outgrowths of these companies, but independent of them, are the Highbinders’ societies... Though known as Freemasons, the Highbinders are really banded together for black-mail and police purposes. If by any factor the confidence of a Highbinder is won, he will have no hesitation in acknowledging that he lives by black-mail...

The mother society among the Highbinders is the Chee Kung Tong, which occupies a substantial three-story building on Spofford Alley, in the heart of the Chinese Quarter of San Francisco... The influence of the head society is far-reaching, and it is doubtful whether its leaders would heed any order from a lesser source than the Chinese Consul. It is even said that the Consul’s order has sometimes been overruled, as there are men in the Chee Kung Tong who acknowledge no allegiance to China... The Highbinder is almost entirely beyond the pale of American law. His secret hiding-places defy the ingenuity of the police; he holds an oath in court in contempt; he can get a score of witnesses in his society to swear to anything which he desires; he has been the chief cause of the difficulty in the enforcement of the Restriction Act in San Francisco.

The Chee Kung Tong, or Zhigongtang (致公堂), was an anti-Manchu organization that would later give critical financial support to Sun Yatsen. While I believe it did have ties to the Heaven and Earth secret society, I seriously doubt it would've listened to the Qing Imperial Consul. I'd also point out the Restriction Act mentioned at the end - at this time, Chinese were denied citizenship and even had it taken away (the Chinese Exclusion Act wouldn't be officially repealed until 1943). As a result of Chinese exclusion, communities had to build their own networks for language, housing, employment, medical care, etc.

Anyway, the play The First Born would appear in London in November of 1897. The New York Times was on hand again, and reported the Chinese ambassador witnessed the performance. It's not clear who it was who attended the performance, but at the time the Chinese embassy to Britain included some prominent Chinese officials, such as Luo Fenglu and Chen Yifan (who in 1914 refused to sign the Simla Convention on Tibet). Another was Zhang Deyi, who, like Luo Fenglu, was from Fujian, and like Chen Yifan, was a graduate of the Tongwenguan. He accompanied the first fact-finding missions to Europe and America, and wrote about them in the books Strange Tales from across the Ocean 《航海述奇》、More Strange Tales 《再述奇》、and Eight Strange Tales 《八述奇》. Some of these were translated in Diary of a Chinese Diplomat, now out of print. I wonder if Zhang Deyi or his colleagues ever wrote about that play. It'd be fascinating to read their perspective.

Xinjiang Funny Money

From the difficult to navigate but very fascinating Tuku historical photo archive:

This six billion yuan banknote was issued in 1949 by the nominally Guomindang government of Xinjiang. Inflation was pretty bad. A few people on the Chinese 'net seem to think this is the largest numerical banknote ever issued in the world, but I know their wrong because I own one of these from the last days of Yugoslavia:
After the Communists took over Xinjiang, alot of people weren't using cash. They were the scrip issued by the Bingtuan, the military veterans who were mobilized in Xinjiang to develop agriculture (and secure the borders).

From the NYT Archives: Zhongnanhai Watch, 1907

Watching the transition of power in China, October 1907:

THE CHANGES IN CHINA.

October 13, 1907, Sunday

Predictions have been freely made of late that the approaching abdication of the Dowager Empress would be the signal for internal commotions in China amounting to a revolution, and possibly the breaking apart of the empire through the effort of the Chinese race to unseat the ruling Manchus. For this reason, it is inferred, and indeed proclaimed by the highest authority, the throne is bent on dissolving the distinctions, superficial and fundamental, between the two races, and resolved upon liberal reforms that will modernize China. The imperial decree of October 1 declared that preparations should be made to give China a constitution. Secretary Taft, in his speech at Shanghai, spoke in warning of "radical and sudden reforms", but he advocated a reform along lines of internal development, education, the enlargement of trade, and predicted that this would increase commerce and advance friendly relations with this country.

The gradual reform programme of the Dowager Empress and her advisors is China's hope in the impending crisis. A sudden cleavage from the past would bring into powerful antagonism the adherents of traditional power and the more zealous forces of reform. There is no question that civil war is feared by the reigning family...

The fleet of the United States will remain in Pacific waters during the months preceding the abdication of the Dowager Empress, which is set for the Chinese New Year. Whether our warships are sent merely on a "practice cruise" or in view of complications with Japan, or because of coming events in China, it is certain that they will be in a position of advantage should anything happen to conflict with the American policy of the "open door"...

Our Secretary of War refused to speculate upon the probable action of the United States in case the interests of American merchants were placed in jeopardy, but he did say:

"It is clear that our merchants are being roused to the importance of the Chinese export trade and they would view with deep concern any and all political obstacles to its maintenance and expansion. This feeling is likely to find expression in the action of the American government."

From Asia Times Online, today, Multinationals Fear US-China Trade Wars:

The US Congress is about to enact legislation that would levy punitive duties on Chinese goods. This could lead to unintended consequences for both American consumers and the wider US economy.

Some 119 leading multinational companies agree - including Boeing, Citigroup, General Motors, and Microsoft. They have called on Congress to reject protectionist legislation against China, arguing that "imposing unfair barriers to trade in the name of currency valuation or product safety is not a solution to the underlying concerns". It was "a vote for free trade", reported the state-owned China Daily, which, as so many other Chinese observers do, argues that rising protectionism among some US lawmakers "seriously threatens the interests of China, the United States itself and the world at large".

Again, in October 1907:

A REFORMER IN CHINA.; Achievements of Yuan-Shih-Kai Attracting Wide Attention.

October 29, 1907, Tuesday

WASHINGTON, Oct. 28. -- Another Li Hung-Chang has arisen in China and his achievements are attracting attention throughout the civilized world. He is Yuan-Shih-Kai, formerly Viceroy of Chih-li, now President of the Wei-Wu-Pu, or Board of Foreign Affairs at Peking. He assumed the reins of Government in Chih-li at a time when chaos and disorder prevailed in the province... During Mr. Yuan's term as governor, Mr. Ragsdale [American Consul-General] says he established the best of relations with foreigners, and by sturdy honest efforts won the goodwill of the natives as well. His advice, even then, was sought by Peking, and the best edicts were the result of his suggestions. Notable among these were the promises of efforts toward Constitutional government, and those relating to the suppression of the opium traffic.

Yuan Shikai, six years later*, would dissolve the national assembly, and in 1915, declare himself emperor. Today, Will Hutton wonders if one of Hu Jintao's successor will be China's Gorbachev.

In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev's readiness to question communism was intertwined with his membership of the Soviet Union's fifth generation of leaders. He did not champion perestroika and glasnost alone; much of the nomenklatura had decided that the Soviet economic and social model was dysfunctional, corrupt and endemically inefficient and had to change.

Will one of Hu Jintao's two 'Lis', as the frontrunners to succeed him, Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao, are popularly known, feel the same way as they walk out in front of the cameras in the Great Hall of the People on Friday? Will one prove to be China's Gorbachev?

*In 1913, the New York Times also reported that Yuan Shikai's brother was growing opium illegally.

Xinjiang Netizens Tackle Child Thief Rings

Some child beggars are intentionally crippled by pimps to elicit sympathy [photo from PCPop]

Shanghaiist mentioned a couple of weeks back that the Chinese government was protesting a British documentary on Chinese child trafficking. Opposite End of China made a great catch a few months ago: an article in The Australian entitled Stolen ethnic minority kids victims of Chinese `Fagins'. Fagin refers to the leader of a gang of pickpockets in Oliver Twist, and for years, many Uyghur pickpockets and thieves have been pimped by adults much like Charles Dickens character. The article is entirely based a report from Hong Kong's Phoenix Weekly (凤凰周刊), which also gave significant coverage to the Xiamen PX controversy in the lead up to major protests. The article (in Chinese) is available in full thanks to Li Mazi over at Douban. In The Australian's summary, the government 4000 children are missing, while the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences says 90% of them are forcibly abducted or tricked from their homes. Phoenix Weekly is quick to point out far more than 4000 are likely missing, as many abductions would go unreported. Some parents actually sell their children to these bosses, not to mention these children are found in practically every major Chinese city. Money from these thieving rings is often sent back to villages in Xinjiang, among the poorest in the entire country, and local officials sometimes turn a blind eye. The Phoenix Weekly article describes two children, Anwar and Nurguli. Anwar, a 10 year old boy who had been a top student in primary school, was kidnapped from his home in Yecheng and taken all the way to Guangzhou to work as a pickpocket. Nurguli, a 12 year old girl, was sold to traffickers by her stepfather and repeatedly raped.

The Phoenix Weekly article is quite thorough and The Australian only gives passing mention to Chinese netizens actions, some of whom are "vigilantes regularly post photos of Uighur child thieves online, calling on the police to crack down on them. Others seek to help the children only to see them handed back to traffickers parading as relatives."

The website Uyghur Online, a BBS forum, has a whole section devoted to aiding Uyghur street children. Phoenix Weekly quotes one founder stating they would like to turn the forum group into a function NGO, but it is difficult to get government approval. Nonetheless, an administrator named Ali, who claims to be a student at a Peoples Security Bureau University, posted a manifesto on several other sites declaring their desire to start a Xinjiang Uyghur Street Childrens Aid Association to act as a bridge between the PSB, the Xinjiang government and the children themselves, facilitating their return to some sort of family life.

Other articles of relevance: Uyghur blogger Qaghan points out the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which China is a party to, emphasizes the importance of family, but the relevant government departments tend to criticize families instead of assisting them. He also points out that hardly any Uyghur community organizations exist. The most likely reason for this, which he does not mention, is that greater restrictions are placed on Uyghur organizations due to fears of separatist activity. Qaghan also points to a study that found more than 85% of Uyghur street children come from rural areas, where unemployment is a major problem. This matches with my personal experience; in early 2003, I visited a friend living in a village near Hotan, which is mentioned in the Phoenix Weekly article as a common place where families receive a cut of the earnings their children make. The night arrived, he mentioned that recently a child trafficking ring had been caught in his community. He was deeply shocked and embarassed about it. You could count the phones in his town on one hand.

Two other articles point out that at least 150,000 street children, of any ethnicity, are known to exist. Moreover, 40% have ended up on the streets more than once, suggesting that simply sending the children home is ineffective.

One other personal anecdote: in 2004, I remember seeing heavily armed police officers patrolling Zhongshan road, where many crippled street children beg. An article at the time claimed the tear gas and automatic weapons were to discourage pickpockets. Needless to say, it didn't work.

From the NYT Archives: The Coming China, 1911

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. Below are excerpts from a 1911 book review of Joseph King Goodrich's book "The Coming China". I've sprinkled it with links to current events I consider similar:

CHINA'S ILL-TIMED STIR; The Ignorance of Her Vast Population Too Dense to Permit the Establishment of an Enduring Republican Government
November 12, 1911, Sunday
Section: Review of books, Page BR709, 1646 words

SURELY he would be a rash man who, in the present condition of affairs, should attempt to prophesy what the China of next year, or even of next week, will be. And therefore Joseph King Goodrich's book on "The Coming China," notwithstanding the apparent promise of its title, recommends itself the more because it attempts so little to predict definite outlines for the future path of the ancient empire. Almost the only matter of importance upon which its author ventures to be entirely sure about the future - his book seems to have been written in the early months of this present year - is that a republic is impossible in China at least for a long time. And already, at such daily accelerated and upsetting speed have events been moving, a republic is not only the hearts desire of the Young Chinaists but a highly probable outcome of the revolution.

Mr. Goodrich, who first went to China as a lad in 1866, has lived there many years and has also been a professor in the Japanese Imperial College at Kyoto, does not deny to the Chinese those traits of character necessary in a people before a real republic is possible. But he thinks the masses of ignorance in the huge population are too vast and too dense to be permeated, at least for a goodly while, by the enlightenment and understanding before an enduring form of republican government can be established. He admits that "There are now so many newspapers published in China, and facilities for sending them to every nook and corner of the realm are now so adequate, that the power which comes with knowledge has attained proportions that surprise Chinese leaders themselves and would amaze all foreigners who were accustomed to conditions a score of years ago."

...The ten or twelve years following the war with Japan were years of steady though slow growth in modern ideas, but Mr. Goodrich counts the real birth of the new China from the close of the Russo-Japanese war of 1905. Since then the development of energy and ambition, of the desire for Western knowledge, and the purpose to apply Western methods to their own life has gone on with a speed more amazing, Mr. Goodrich declares, then is known even to those outsiders who have watched at a distance China's progress. To the Occidental the successive manifestations of these seven-leagued strides that have "come up like thunder out of China", have been bewildering, unexplainable, to a degree that makes them seem to border close upon the impossible.

...Mr. Goodrich does not believe that China can achieve a stable position among the great nations of the Earth until her populace shall have cast off the superstitions of their religion, for he declares most of them are still under the domination of polydemonism.

...Have the other nations, and, in particular, our own country, anything to fear from that coming China? he asks, and gives in reply a decided no. "If," he says, "there are to be railways, inland navigation, post offices, factories, and all the concommitant of advanced life, the blessings must be paid for; the standards of living must be raised, so that the dreaded competition either disappears entirely or fades away into a dim future, when China has raised herself at home quite up to our standard."

China Expat to U.S.: WTF, People?

So I've just come across this Mitt Romney ad via ESWN. Steve Benen, Matt Yglesias of the Atlantic and Kevin Drum of Washington Monthly all seem to be in agreement that this is, as Benen puts it, the dumbest. ad. ever.

I swear this commercial is cobbled together using deleted scenes from Starship Troopers.

Strategic Level Spiritual Warfare in China

Evangelicals have Xinjiang in their sights

Over at Opposite End of China, Michael has had a couple of posts about missionaries working in Xinjiang. Namely, that they keep getting kicked out, and he doesn't find them to be very sociable. In my time in Xinjiang, I also found missionaries to range from distant (I got the impression I didn't know the secret password/handshake) to outright batty. One character was a young man with Coke-bottle-bottom thick glasses who many of us ran into occasionally. He was always armed with a clipboard listing the gospel in Chinese and English and always seemed to be in a great hurry for an appointment. I once said hello to him after watching him ask a cigarette shopkeeper if she had heard the Word and she just ignored him. His side of the conversation consisted entirely of two topics: 1) his impending appointment and 2) had I heard the Word. Rumor has it he finally got an appointment with a provincial official, asked him if he heard the Word, and was sent back to the United States.

While missionaries in Xinjiang didn't really bother me, I was kind of spooked by what I call the "Super Spies for Jesus" phenomenon. I don't just mean the subterfuge of coming as English teachers because missionary activities are restricted. A great deal of missionaries who go to Xinjiang tend to be charismatic Pentecostals who subscribe to the concept of "strategic level spiritual warfare", a concept I first read about over at No Fear of the Future.

While I'm no expert on the matter, I have been able to piece together some of the theory behind SLSW and the related idea of spiritual mapping. Note that alot of these sources tend to be from various Christian sects, since SLSW is a bit of a controversial topic - many Evangelicals seem to believe it more or less means incorporating the occult into Christianity. Its roots lie among the British charismatic revival of the 60 and 70s, according to Mennonite magazine Direction, while the Miller Avenue Baptist Church claims it started in 1989 with John Dawson's book "Taking Our Cities for God: How to Break Spiritual Strongholds". Dawson claimed that "satanic forces manifest themselves in the culture of the city", and one must study the history and character of a city in order to cast out the demons that rule it and convert its inhabitants. Direction points out that in 1987, "Prior to the March [for Jesus, in London], a woman named Barbara Pymm reported being given a vision of two angels, swords raised and crossed over the city, “waiting for us to give the word to release them and their armies to fight against the principalities and powers over London.” The language of principalities, powers and strongholds come from bits of the New Testament, and SLSW interprets its somewhat literally - namely that there are spiritual battles between the forces of God and, well, other Gods.

One of the biggest proponents of SLSW has been C. Peter Wagner, of Global Harvest Ministries, who has written books such as Warfare Prayer and Breaking Strongholds in Your City. In Confronting the Powers, Wagner argues that spiritual warfare has been going on for centuries, and points to such major battles as St. John versus the Temple of Artemis, St. Benedict versus the Temple of Apollo, and St. Boniface versus the Tree of Thor (the Nordic guy with the hammer). In every case, some really strong praying essentially exorcises these demons - other peoples religions - from a place. In this Christian Science Monitor article, an example of a Nigerian preacher who goes after a local fortune teller:

Pondering the message of Eph.6:12 ("For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world..."), they prayed to identify the source of Kiambu's spiritual oppression, Mr. Muthee says. Their answer: the spirit of witchcraft.

Their research into the community revealed that a woman called "Mama Jane" ran a "divination clinic" frequented by the town's most powerful people.

After months of prayer, Muthee held a crusade that "brought about 200 people to Christ." Their church in the basement of a grocery store was dubbed "The Prayer Cave," as members set up round-the-clock intercession. Mama Jane counterattacked, he says, but eventually "the demonic influence - the 'principality' over Kiambu - was broken," and she left town.

The atmosphere changed dramatically: Bars closed, the crime rate dropped, people began to move to the area, and the economy took an upturn. The church now has 5,000 members, he says, and 400 members meet to pray daily at 6 a.m.

In some ways, spiritual warfare resembles (to a non-believer like myself, anyway) a sort of Dungeons and Dragons approach to the world. Some believers even mime putting on "God's armor", in another biblical reference taken rather literally, before engaging the enemy. There's lots of swords and demons and, well, magic.

Wagner's close associate, George Otis, ran with some of these ideas and came up with spiritual mapping. Spiritual mapping, for Otis, meant determining the location of "satanic command and control centers", which are invisible and not to be confused with visible sacred sites, namely churches, mosques, synagogues, etc. At least, so says this blog on heresies run by Discernment Ministries (they consider spiritual warfare heretical). An interesting point the blog does bring up is that spiritual mapping focuses on ethnicity and "unreached peoples". Indeed, a major project along these lines is the Joshua Project, a sort of CIA World Factbook for Pentecostals, which lists the "Unreached Ethnic Peoples" of the world with colorful maps and statistics. Wagner has more recently espoused the idea of identificational repentance and corporate sin. In other words, Wagner argues that people should repent "national sins":

Identify the national sin. This is no place for vagueness. We must be specific, not evasive. For example, the principal sin of my nation, the United States, is clearly racism and our corporate sins which have established the spiritual strongholds are clear. The broadest and most pervasive sin that our nation ever committed was bringing Africans to our shores as slaves ­ human merchandise to be bought, sold and used for any conceivable purpose to satisfy the desires of their white masters. But beyond this, the deepest root of national iniquity, and also, as I see it, one of the primary causes of our subsequent lust for slaves, was the horrendous way we white Americans treated our hosts, the American Indians. What does the breaking of over 350 solemn treaties say about U.S. national integrity?

The writer behind this new doctrine? John Dawson again. Wagner's example doesn't mention what this means for new converts in the "40/70 Window", which is the name for the area of the Eastern hemisphere between 40 degrees and 70 degrees north of the equator, or Europe and everything above, say, Pakistan and Iran, slicing nicely between Xinjiang and Tibet. Previously the campaign was the "10/40 Window", which focused more on India and Africa. Another example of identificational repentance is this one, when a Chinese convert confessed the corporate sin of the People's Republic of China invading India in 1962 to Punjabi attendees.

Brother Peter Xu initiated an act of identificational repentance on behalf of his homeland China. It was directed to the many Indian delegates that were in attendance. Historically, the 1962 China—India Border War, which began 43 years prior to the week of the Asian Summit (October 10–14), was a dark spot on the relations between these ancient civilizations. This public repentance was a deeply emotional time as delegates from Taiwan and Hong Kong joined in solidarity with these Chinese leaders to humbly cry out to our Heavenly Father for mercy and forgiveness on behalf of their motherland.

The Christian Science Monitor also reported of the Windows and Joshua projects back in 1999, giving us some idea of the number of participants (allegedly):

Praying Through the Window began in October 1993, when some 21 million (according to AD 2000) prayed for the 62 nations in the window, and 188 prayer-journey teams took 257 journeys to pray on site, visiting each of those nations. During October 1995, some 36 million followed a prayer calendar targeting 100 "gateway cities" in the region, along with more prayer journeys. And in October 1997, prayers focused on the 1,739 unreached-people groups. The final effort is planned for October, targeting 3,000 "strategic towns."

To support this and "Joshua 2000" - the church-planting project - research and mapping organizations have created databases, people profiles, and maps to give intercessors tools to make prayers specific.

The developer of the Joshua Project, Ralph Winter, was involved with both the Fuller School of World Missions and the AD2000 project, both of which were founded by C. Peter Wagner. Wagner himself is heavily involved with the Lausanne Movement, started by Billy Graham, and was doing many co-projects with Ted Haggard, of gay sex and Jesus Camp fame. And the language of SLSW is used elsewhere as well:

Q. I live in an area where drugs, alcoholism, immoral behavior and despair are a way of life. Since moving here, I've begun drinking and lying to the woman I love. My business and personal life have declined. Do you believe there are areas under demonic strongholds? What can we do? Should we move away?

Pat Robertson: You ought to move as fast as you can. Yes, there are demonic strongholds, without question. There is no doubt about it. There are certain areas where demon princes hold sway. And this thing has obviously got hold of you. Get away from there as fast as you can. Confess and recommit to the Lord. Absolutely. But get away from there. Flee.

The AD2000 movement, Global Harvest and the Lausanne Movement all involve an interchangeable cast of characters. Global Harvest and C. Peter Wagner, however, emphasize the 40/70 Window and, curiously, Xinjiang. Under the auspices of the Strategic Prayer Network, which Haggard was involved in, Wagner went to Germany for "Target Germany" in 2001. At Target Germany, Wagner introduced Pastor Kim Sam Seeong (google cache of DOC file) outlining their Silk Road strategy:

"He is one of the two major apostles of the 40/70 Window. Roger Mitchell is the apostle of Target Europe. Kim Sam Seong is the apostle of Target Silk Road."

Kim then said:

Obstacles of the gospel in the Silk Road are about worship. Do we have true worship or false worship? Through history in every territory over this Silk Road area, every kind of idol worship, curse, and power came in and spread out. From the West came humanism to this territory, Hellenistic Humanism. From the East the Babylonian worship system and also the Indian worship system with all kinds of things mixed in. It is very difficult to identify what is stronger and what is weaker. Nowadays, we can identify the strongest one, two, or three. The first is the spirit of Moon Goddess or Islam. Because the Silk Road area is Turkic, most of them speak Turkish. They understand each other. Some of them speak the Tajik language but for the most part they speak Turkish. This is a time to raise up the Turkic people. Turkic is the key Hindi people [sp]. From the Silk Road we can evangelize all of the world. If we can identify the spirits in the Turkic people, we can destroy Satan's wells... The Chinese government has a ten year project to develop northwest China, the Xinjiang Province which belongs to the Turkic language group. It is the only Muslim area in China. God is preparing the way to go out through the Silk Road area. The border will be open very wide through the economy. They are going out right now.

So let's get this straight: the adherents of Strategic Level Spiritual Warfare see a strategic, uh, harmony, with the PRC's Western Development Strategy.

In 2000, as the 40/70 Window campaign started to warm up, Wagner said:

Wagner: The greatest challenge facing the global mission movement in the coming decade is to evangelize the 40/70 Window, the only major region of the world, with the exception of the Arab Muslim bloc, where the movement of God is virtually at a standstill. The two major segments of the 40/70 Window are post-Christian Europe and the Silk Road/Turkic Belt. As examples, there are proportionately fewer born-again Christians in Poland than in Nepal. There are proportionately fewer born-again Christians in Spain than in Japan. And I believe that the significant breakthrough that we have been praying for in the entire Muslim world, including the Middle East, will begin among non-Arab Muslims from Turkey to the Xinjiang Province of China.

Probably my favorite example of spiritual warfare in Xinjiang is from this 1993 newsletter from Revival Chinese Ministries International, a Pentecostal outfit in Hong Kong. A gospel reading team in Xinjiang kept getting beaten up, perhaps because they were doing this:

According to the leader of this dare-to-die gospel team, team members had been conducting prayers of spiritual warfare outside the mosques for some years now. Of late, the team has sensed a change in the spiritual atmosphere there.

The Lausanne Movement has a long, long article on the intricacies of spiritual warfare that I can't be bothered to read by Paul Hiebert, another advocate of these theories. More interesting is the Lausanne Movement's Chinese case study which is supposedly by one "Luke Shao", who spent ten years studying Qi Gong, only to realize after he became Christian that he had been in contact with a demonic power:

From Luke's ten year experience in qigong, he divided the practice of qigong into three stages. The first stage is physical exercise through a method of breaking so as to move the "air" (qi) into the interior parts of the body for health reasons. The second state is when one desires to have supernatural power, such as the ability to heal illness or extr-sensory perception. That supernatural ability, according to Luke, comes from demonic spirits. The third stage is when one becomes so bound to various demonic spirits that he become totally enslaved by these spirits. During this last stage, one can even experience one's spirit leaving one's body to hover around.

Remember, these are not the doctrines of some whacked out fringe. These are movements connected to most of the major leaders of the Evangelical communities, and they preach what more or less seems to amount to a form of religious imperialism. While they deserve the right to practice their beliefs openly, I find nothing innocent or sweet about them. At least the Jesuits brought their science gear.

Fighting the Fickle Firewall with Feedsky

I noticed that BoingBoing took notice of Ars Technica's article on the blocking of RSS feeds in China:

More recent reports tell us that the PSB appears to have extended this block to all incoming URLs that begin with "feeds," "rss," and "blog," thus rendering the RSS feeds from many sites--including ones that aren't blocked in China, such as Ars Technica--useless.

Woah, hold on there kids! So far the only RSS block I know is Feedburner - which has been blocked before. Meanwhile online aggregators like Bloglines and Google Reader remain unaffected. Hell, my aggregator is still passing along feeds to me that are from Feedburner! Anyway, Ya I Yee has pointed out that Chinese RSS giant Feedsky is an alternative. Which got me wondering:

Does Feedsky filter firewalled feeds?

Some quick experiments to see if Feedsky even acknowledges the existence of some feeds:

This blog's Blogspot feed: Yes, it is filtered.

This blog's Feedburner feed: Filtered.

My Flickr feed: No!

Ya, I Yee's Feedburner Feed: No! Wait, what? Why didn't mine go through?

The traditionally blocked BBC News Feed (which I get laundered by an aggregator): Yes, filtered.

The Flickr page of Jake Appelbaum, home of the notorious Oiwan Lam photo link: No, not filtered!

Jess Nevin's LiveJournal: Yup, filtered.

A Google search for site:feedsky.com + blogspot or + flickr shows there are some Chinese bloggers whose flickr feeds are chugging right along through Feedsky, and at least one Blogspot blog that was feeding through Feedburner to Feedsky with no problems until September 24th, when updates stopped, roughly the same time Feedburner was blocked. Poor guy had Feedburner laundering Blogspot for Feedsky, only for Feedburner to get written off too.

Except for Ya, I Yee's Feedburner. What's up with that? The Fickle Firewall's flightiness f**ks with us again.

Chinese Bloggers Also Hunting the New 094 Sub

Chinese bloggers are, unsurprisingly, just as into subspotting as the FAS. Here's a few photo comparisons done by BBS members at Meyet.com, which is all about "military intelligence gathering, analysis, foreign policy, strategy and entertainment. Oh, and "polite language". Sounds like the Chinese Danger Room to me. These are of the first sub spotted on Google Earth - if I can be bothered maybe I'll drop them a note about Hans Kristensen's new discovery. Also included is a rendering of the 094 from a Japanese magazine - reproduced on a Chinese news site.

FAS Spots Another (Two?) Chinese Ballistic Subs

Federation of American Scientist blogger Hans M. Kristensen has struck again, this time sighting not one but two Chinese ballistic missile submarines, this time at the Huludao shipyards. The first one was spotted at the Xiaopingdao shipyards in July, and it could be one of the two pictured here. Or there's three. Whatever, the U.S. Navy has long predicted they'd build five. Innoculate yourself against the impending claims of China dominating the Pacific by reading ArmsControlWonk's soon to be three part series on the 094 submarine and its limitations.

What's the Retirement Age for the Politburo Again?

The New York Times says:

Mr. Zeng reached the formal retirement age of 68 this year, and party officials say he has stated repeatedly that he intends to step down.

Willy Lam says:

Considering that the age of 68 was set as the retirement age for Politburo members at both the 15th and the 16th Party Congresses

The Hoover Institute's Lyman Miller says:

Most of these leaders will still be well short of 70, the age at which by apparent internal party norm leaders are expected to retire at the next party congress.

Covering the last Party Congress, the BBC says:

Politburo's informal retirement age of 70

OK, I give up. Is it formal? Informal? 68? 70? Was it set during the 14th, 15th or 16th Party Congress? And if we can't get this basic rule clear, what's the point of placing bets on who's in and out based on age?

On a more interesting note, someone has actually noted what might happen to Wang Lequan, who leads the Party, the Production and Construction Corps, and pretty much everything else in Xinjiang:

A political leader who has stayed in one position for ten years can no longer stay in the same position. Thus, three provincial Party Secretaries will have to leave their current posts. Wang Lequan, Party Secretary of Xinjiang and a member of the Politburo, has been in his position for more than a decade. Wang is usually considered a member of the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group because he once worked as Deputy Secretary of the Shandong Provincial Communist Youth League Committee between March 1982 and September 1986. He became Acting Party Secretary of Xinjiang in September 1994 and Party Secretary of Xinjiang in December 1995. He reached his ten-year limit in December 2005.

... Nie Weiguo, an alternate member of the 16th Central Committee of the CCP and Deputy Secretary of Xinjiang, is a good candidate for the post of Xinjiang's Party Secretary. A native of Chongqing, Nie turned 54 in 2006 He has spent most of his working life in Sichuan, starting as an educated youth (zhishi qingnian) in Nanchuan, Sichuan in January 1969. He worked in the Peilin Prefecture (later Peilin Municipality and then Peilin District) for 17 years (1983–2000) and served as Deputy Secretary of Chongqing for three years (2002–5). He was transferred to Xinjiang in March 2005 as Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Construction Corps, Board Chairman of China New Construction Corporation and Deputy Secretary of Xinjiang. Notably, his predecessor, Chen Demin, was only a standing member of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regional Party Committee, but Nie was made a Deputy Secretary of Xinjiang. It is also possible that the Party Centre will transfer another individual from elsewhere to replace Wang Lequan. But whoever is the new Party Secretary of Xinjiang is unlikely to obtain a seat in the 17th Politburo. Wang Lequan's career path is probably unique to him.

So it seems Wang is heading out the door. But wait! Wang Lequan is a Youth League man, and so Hu's homeboy. Plus, he's a lively 63. Aggh! I know this is a pointless game, but it's so addictive!

Chinese Howl

Seen in a Shenzhen Bookstore

According to the New York Times, yesterday was the 50th anniversary of a San Francisco court ruling that Allen Ginsburg's Howl was not obscene.

Yet Ginsberg, who died in 1997, was heard online and not on the New York radio station WBAI-FM, affiliated with the Pacifica network, because the station, according to an article on Wednesday, feared that by broadcasting “Howl” it could run afoul of the Federal Communications Commission’s interpretation of indecency and incur bankrupting fines.

Janet Coleman, WBAI’s arts director, said that when the idea of airing the poem to test the law was proposed, “I said, ‘Yes, let’s try it.’” The radio station has a history of championing the First Amendment, having broadcast the comedian George Carlin’s “seven dirty words” routine that resulted in a 1978 Supreme Court ruling on indecency. But after several harsh F.C.C. rulings in 2004 — against CBS for a glimpse of Janet Jackson’s breast during the Super Bowl halftime show and against Fox for curse words used during the Billboard Music Awards — “our lawyer felt it was too risky,” Ms. Coleman said. The commission can impose “draconian fines,” she said, that could put WBAI out of business.

Listen to the Pacifica broadcast "Howl Against Censorship" online, where, for now, the FCC can't touch it.

George Harrison's Shanghai Surprise: Proof of Hollywood's Insanity re: Asia

I picked this up at my local DVD store a while ago thinking it would be one of those "so awful its funny" movies. And man, did it deliver. The Agony Booth has an eleven page tour-de-force breakdown of what is listed on IMDB as #80 in its 100 bottom ranked films, but really George Harrison captured the essence of the entire production in the title song for the movie, which he executive produced. Some sort of karmic balance for producing Monty Python's Life of Brian, I guess. Sing along kids, my favorite bit is "I'd like to know you but you're acting so coolie." Wow, dude. Wow.

I can't understand how i've gone astray,
I should be sailing away on a liner.
I was knocked on my back on a dock at yang-tse,
It's a hell of a way to see china.

But i'm ready.
You must be crazy...
And you got no money...
And you're a liar...

My straits are dire from the wok into the fire,
I'd like to trust you but i've broken my rickshaw.
Sometimes there's no hope in, in chasing opium,
I'd like to love you but i'm not sure what's in your eyes,
Mm, shanghai surprise.

Whatever you're saying, i want it anyway in
Been hanging 'round like a kid at your back door.
Oh, babe!
You could be kinder, and show me asia minor,
I'll let you love me, let you see what's here in my eyes,
Shanghai surprise.

You must be crazy... crazy...
And you got no money... money...
And it seems like madness...

Back streets so crowded that no room to swing a cat,
I'd like to know you but you're acting so coolie.
I'm finding out pursued by evil looking dudes,
It's getting hot for me like tofu when it deep fries,
Oh, shanghai surprise.

But, baby, you look like any common crook
That's hanging 'round in those real shady places.
Oh, baby!
While you assess me, why not try to impress me?
Step over here, let me see what's there in your eyes,
Oh, shanghai surprise.

I don't understand how i got delayed,
I should be sailing today on a liner.
Was kicked in the ass on a dock at yang-tse,
It's no way for a man to see china.

But i'm ready.
You must be crazy... crazy...
And you got no money... money...
But you're a tryer...

My straits are dire from the wok into the fire,
I'd like to meet you but i've broken my chopstick.
Sometimes there's no hope in, in chasing promises,
I wanna love you though it could prove to be unwise,
Shanghai surprise.

Whatever you're saying, i want it anyway in
In hanging 'round for a ride on your rickshaw.
Oh, babe!
You may correct me, now that you've inspected me,
Come over here, let me feel you cut down to size,
Oh, shanghai surprise.

My straits are dire from the wok into the fire,
I'd like to know you but i'm not really social.
Sometimes it's no joke, can't cope with opium,
I'd like to love you but i'm not sure what's in your eyes,
Shanghai surprise.

Shanghai surprise.

Shanghai surprise.

And you got no money...
But you're a tryer...

Wow.

Last Word on Jackie Chan

I will give Jackie credit for this, which is just hilarious. And Herman's Hermits covering Billy Idol's White Wedding is clearly the product of a fevered mind.

On Asian Stereotypes in American Film

After writing about Jackie Chan's refusal to take responsibility for the Rush Hour franchise, it occurred to me that I hadn't even mentioned the fact that the Rush Hour movies are full of eye-rolling Asian stereotypical humor. It's interesting to see that he's also cast in next years animated "Kung Fu Panda", where he'll be playing Master Monkey! Lucy Liu will be Master Viper! Nobody else Asian in the main cast there, the title panda will be Jack Black and "Shifu" will be played by Dustin Hoffman. Meanwhile Lucy Liu is involved in a Charlie Chan remake, and there's a Kung Fu remake out there as well.

So thank the gods there's a Bruce Lee mockumentary coming out, Finishing the Game, by Justin Lin, who made Better Luck Tomorrow, in which he tackled the Asian American overachiever bit. And then there's the documentary Slanted Screen covering the history of Asian American men in film and television. It points out the ghost of Bruce Lee, and chopsuey in general, looms large over Asian portrayals in Hollywood. Lin makes a similar point:

I think it was a few years ago there was this thing that came out called "The Lost Interviews with Bruce Lee." It's this black and white Canadian kind of Charlie Rose type show and they were interviewing him, and it was a great interview. The thing that really blew me away was if you watch that interview and you didn't know when that interview took place, everything that he was saying could apply to today's Asian-American actors and today's filmmakers, so I thought if somehow we could pull it off and make it '70s, it gave it more context. That was kind of the inspiration.

Somebody go buy Jackie some tickets.

209 years, 137 countries: U.S. Military's Visited Countries

I think isolationism lost

I keep the Federation of American Scientists blog Secrecy News in my RSS because they republish handy dandy Congressional Research Service reports, usually to see what they write on China. Today I checked out "Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2007,", which looks suspiciously like something I think I saw in something Howard Zinn wrote. I thought it'd be handy to put it all on a map, but as I realized it didn't include all the countries U.S. forces entered in World War II, or some of the more recent bases and "lily pads" the U.S. has established (Pakistan, for example).

So I slapped this together with some stuff from Global Security, Military.com, what WW2 history I could remember (I know I'm missing something), and some Googling. To be fair, some of the older events in the CRS report are things like "a dozen Marines deployed to protect Consul-General in Abyssinia", but if CRS includes it, so do I. I'm still wondering about post-Soviet Eastern Europe, which is changing everyday (missile defense in Azerbaijan?), Southern Africa considering U.S. support for South Africa, and whether or not anymore countries would be included if I went through peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions or U.S. military aid. But hey, it's pretty much the whole world anyway.

Jackie Chan Apologizes for Crappy "Rush Hour" films, Blames Cultural Differences

This Yahoo! article caught my eye: Jackie Chan isn't a fan of 'Rush Hour'.

"When we finished filming, I felt very disappointed because it was a movie I didn't appreciate and I did not like the action scenes involved. I felt the style of action was too Americanized and I didn't understand the American humor," Chan said in a blog entry on his Web site seen Sunday.

The reason the blog entry was "seen" on Sunday is because Jackiechan.com apparently just added a slew of older "JC Messages". In the entry, Jackie goes on:

But to my surprise, this movie was exceptionally successful in the box office and results were very pleasing. Because this movie was so popular, I was offered an irresistible amount of money to film the sequel and I could not say no.

Um, does Jackie Chan have financial problems I don't know about? Cuz I think he could say no. Also, Jackie made $15 million against 15% of gross on Rush Hour 3, as well as gaining China/HK distribution rights. Yknow, I think by the third movie he could've been asking for executive producer rights as well and more creative control - not to mention asking someone to explain the jokes to him. There were 9 years between Rush Hour 1 and 3 to figure that one out.

But the worst part is not Jackie blatantly admitting he cashed in not once, but twice after deciding he didn't like the product. No, it's this bit of wrongheadedness:

To me, it was about making another sequel for the audience around the world because in each country I travel to, someone would always ask me, “When will you film another Rush Hour?” But when I‘m in Asia, a lot of people would ask me, “When will you film another Drunken Master?” Or “When will you film another Police Story?” No one asks me about filming another Rush Hour. From what I have observed, I now understand the difference in movie tastes between the American/European audience and the Asian audience.

The reason, Jackie, that nobody in America asks about when you're gonna make another Drunken Master or Police Story is because they've never seen them. Why is that? It's not because of cultural differences - it's because the American companies buying distribution rights to Asian films bury them or release them with as little marketing as possible ("Hero", "Shaolin Soccer", "Spirited Away"), rename them ("Drunken Master II" is called "The Legend of Drunken Master" in the USA, "Police Story 5" is "Supercop 2"), re-edit them (Such as "Tom Yum Goong", aka The Protector, aka "Honour of the Dragon", aka "Warrior King", for which the Miramax US DVD release murdered the main character's father who originally lived) and release them with the shittiest DVD covers of all time:

That chick on the cover? Not in the goddamn movie. And of course there's all that goddamn dubbing. It's not cute anymore. Stop it. There are online petitions against Disney and their ilk for all this butchery, but y'know who might really be able to stop these villains from killing Asian film in the US and Europe? Jackie Chan. Unfortunately, he's too busy swimming in his pools of cash and complaining about cultural barriers.

Oh and Jackie? Alot of China seems to think "The Myth" sucked, even though they endlessly love (to my chagrin) Endless Love (无尽的爱). Maybe there isn't so much disagreement between cultures on what makes a crappy movie.

Bonus Jackie Chan insanity:

I also admire the local government and the regional police force for their full support towards the film industry. They make the whole of Hollywood aware of the industry.

Yes, because no one in Hollywood would be aware of the Hollywood industry if it weren't for the valiant efforts of the local government and regional police force. The mind reels.